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Before change can be introduced successfully, we have to
know why we are where we are today. This is as true of pol-
icy as it is of individual behavior. There are a number of
suggestions for substantial change in our agricultural pol-
icy. Few address up front the issue of whether government
should be involved in agriculture. Thinking about the evo-
lution of today’s policy may encourage us to dig a little
deeper into our objectives for agricultural policy and ask
whether we are attempting to reach these most effectively.
Background
The Jeffersonian notion of agricultural fundamentalism
was more a rationale for a kind of democratic society
rather than a rationale for government involvement in
agriculture. This prescribed the maintenance of a popula-
tion of yeoman farmers who would be the backbone of
democracy as small, independent-propertied individuals.
The Louisiana Purchase extended the opportunity for the
expansion (geographically and in numbers) of this citi-
zenry, while shutting out the British and the Spanish. Gov-
ernment’s involvement in agriculture for the first hundred
years was largely land policy (Northwest Territories Act
and Lewis & Clark expedition, for example) to create a
property survey and rights system and settle the central
expanse of the country and the land west of the Missis-
sippi. The creation of the extensive public domain
through expansion also involved moving these lands into
private hands through veterans’ programs and homestead
acts.
Government also helped create infrastructure – the
most notable early example being the Erie Canal, which
opened up the middle of the country to export markets in
Europe and set the future for New York as the commercial
center of the nation. Agricultural interests agitated for
public infrastructure that would ease the transport of
goods to market. Later came support for railroads, and
ultimately the regulation of rail rates to prevent monopoly
charges for transport of agricultural inputs and commodi-
ties. 
In the 1860s, the Department of Agriculture was
established and both the Homestead Act and the Morrill
Act were passed. All three were critical to the development
of agriculture and all three brought benefits to the farmer,
providing resources and infrastructure, but not proscribing
production. The rationale for these actions was one of
helping agriculture prosper and with it the economic
development of the country. Monetary policy and trade
also became key issues for agriculture.
One early major role of the Department of Agriculture
had been seed distribution. However, under Secretary of
Agriculture, Wilson (in the early 1900s), the Department
became a scientific establishment capable of leading agri-
cultural research. The early 1900s were a golden age for
agriculture. From the Civil War, agriculture had suffered
through both the nation’s business cycles and the extension
of agricultural lands and production that constantly drove
down prices. In the early 1900s, the frontier closed and
industrialization and immigrant population growth surged
and increased net demand for agricultural commodities. It
is no accident that farmers chose 1909 to 1914 as the base
for parity.
Yet, rural agriculture was still disadvantaged relative to
urban industry. Teddy Roosevelt’s Country Life Commis-
sion (1908) looked into the deficiencies of agriculture and
country life and the means by which they might be reme-
died. From this report came rural free mail delivery, the
Smith Lever Act and the state experiment stations, and
improvements in rural health and education. Whatever222 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2006 • 21(4)
the rationale, the tradition of govern-
ment involvement in agriculture was
still indirect, helping stimulate settle-
ment, defining boundaries and prop-
erty rights, building transportation
and infrastructure, and improving
communications, technology, and
education. It was not until the great
agricultural collapse after the First
World War that government, with a
rationale born of prolonged depres-
sion, began to enter directly into
agricultural markets, production, and
the livelihood of farmers.
Agricultural prices broke around
the world in the summer of 1920.
This was a quick end to the bubble of
land prices and input costs that had
been occurring since the First World
War. A national agricultural confer-
ence assembled in 1923 that called
for economic equality for agriculture
(a fair share of the national income)
and adjustment of farm production
to demand. From 1923 on, farm
groups lobbied for government
action to relieve rural distress. The
McNary-Haugen Bill became the
central vehicle for a policy to help
agriculture. This policy would allo-
cate a reduced portion of the crop to
domestic demand and raise domestic
prices, while the “surplus” would go
to the export market. Now govern-
ment is seen in a price and supply
determining role. The Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1929 put the gov-
ernment in the role of influencing
markets with a Federal Farm Board
administering a revolving fund of
500 million dollars to loan to cooper-
atives to store and withhold com-
modities. This proved to be futile
(Benedict, 1953).
By 1933, the exchange value of
farm products to industrial goods
was 50% of the pre-war average
(Davis, 1940, p. 313). The cash
economy in rural areas had ground to
a halt. When the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration came to Washington, there
was fear that there would be revolu-
tion in the countryside if something
were not done. 
The New Deal prescribed a new
role for government involving direct
intervention into markets and indi-
vidual production decisions by farm-
ers. Much of the discussion of the
period was about raising rural stan-
dards of living to be more compara-
ble to urban standards. This was dif-
ferent from the earlier concept of
purchasing parity based on the 1909-
1914 relative industrial and agricul-
tural costs and prices.
Chester Davis, in the 1940 Agri-
cultural Yearbook, set forth a broad
view of the range of government
actions that affected agriculture in
contrast to the narrow view that only
Farm Bills affected the sector 
“A nation’s agricultural pol-
icy is not set forth in a single
law, or even in a system of
laws dealing directly with
current farm problems. It is
expressed in a complexity of
laws and attitudes which, in
the importance of their
influence on agriculture,
shade off from direct mea-
sures like the Agricultural
Adjustment Act through the
almost infinite fields of taxa-
tion, tariffs, international
trade, and labor, money,
credit, and banking policy”
(Davis, p. 325). 
Today we can add environmental
policy, food safety, and more. These
things now set the larger environ-
ment for agriculture, and like Paul
Volker’s decision to stop inflation in
the early 1980s, can be the overriding
government influence on the sector. 
Where does this leave us? The
broadening of interests and policy
impacts works both ways. Policies
that are not thought of as agricultural
can have a determining impact on
agriculture. In addition, what are
thought of as agricultural policies
(the “Farm Bill”) can exert strong
influence on areas beyond the narrow
scope of agriculture. As such, these
broad aspects become part of the fab-
ric of what happens in agriculture
and beyond. 
Reviewing the Legislation
A review of the preambles to 14
major pieces of agricultural legisla-
tion from 1933 to 2002 (generally
those we now refer to as Farm Bills)
provides another characterization of
the evolution of the rationale for gov-
ernment involvement agriculture.
These broadly defined categories of
goals – both explicitly stated and/or
implicitly implied reflecting pro-
grammatic intent as determined by
the authors – are portrayed in Figure
1. Generally, the goals (as indicated
in Figure 1) are the perceived prob-
lems that the programs provided for
in the legislation attempted to allevi-
ate. A few broad conclusions can be
made from reviewing the goals. First,
many of the goals have been consis-
tently addressed over time. Second,
there have been very few recent
changes in direction other than mak-
ing agricultural programs more
responsive to market forces and pro-
moting agriculture as an alternative
source of energy.
Asking Questions about the 
Rationale
There has only been one attempt in
recent decades to determine some
national rationale for agricultural
policy. In 1994, the staff of the Sen-
ate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry prepared for
Senator Richard Lugar a set of ques-
tions on prospective farm policy that
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(Schertz & Doering, 1999). Ques-
tions were asked about commodity,
conservation, export, nutrition, and
rural development programs. A sum-
mary of these indicates that the
attempt was made to ask the ques-
tion, why do we have the farm policy
we do? (i.e., what is the rationale, and
are the programs effective in terms of
what they purport to do?) The
answers the committee received rela-
tive to the request were very broad
and at least to some degree reflective
of the conditions in agriculture at the
time. The answers would certainly
have been much different if the ques-
tion had been asked at the height of
the record prices in 1995 or at the
very low prices realized less than two
years later.
The Broad Response to Rationale 
for Involvement in Agriculture
If one were asked 20 years ago, what
is the rationale for U.S. Government
involvement in agriculture, a
response might have been to increase
farm incomes to the levels of urban
incomes. Admitting the complication
of off-farm income, this objective has
been achieved. In addition, “farmers”
have more accumulated wealth than
their urban cousins, usually in the
form of land.
Another response might be a stra-
tegic one, i.e., that the nation needs
to be self- sufficient in food. Without
government involvement, would
there still be an abundant food sup-
ply, would agricultural exports drop,
and would less acres be cultivated?
Few seem to be concerned that not
enough food would be grown for
domestic consumption. However,
government involvement of some
sort might be justified if food self-
sufficiency were a national concern
(in spite of the fact we wish other
countries to do otherwise so we can
increase our exports to them).
There is a strong rationale for
government involvement in agricul-
ture to reduce risk from natural
causes – drought and flood. We
accomplish this partially through
subsidized crop insurance and par-
tially through ad hoc disaster pay-
ments. There is a rationale for
involvement and we are doing it,
though probably less cost effectively
than we might.
One broad rationale for govern-
ment involvement under the “reduc-
ing risk” heading is the desire to have
a stable industry over time. Invest-
ments in machinery, buildings, and
human capital are relatively large in
U.S. agriculture. It would be costly to
the sector and to the public, through
higher food prices, if there were
cycles of capitalization and de-capi-
talization of these assets over time.
This is different from decreases in
land values, which the producer (or
landowner) bears directly (decreases
which farm groups fight to prevent).
The banking community also has a
large stake in this rationale, especially
during times when loans have been
based on asset values rather than on
the ability to repay, as in the farm
financial crisis of the late 1980s.
Price stability is another leg of the
“reducing risk” rationale. Traditional
farm programs after the 1930s used a
“price stability” rationale to boost
farm incomes by setting loan rates
and later target prices above long-
term average prices (contrary to Wal-
lace’s “ever-normal granary” con-
cept). Fred Waugh’s concern with the
use of price stability as a vehicle for
increasing farm incomes and the
ensuing treasury exposure led him to
write an article attempting to show
 
Figure 1. Agricultural policy goals: 1933-present.
Sources: Flinchbaugh and Knutson (2004); The National Agricultural Law Center (2007).224 CHOICES 4th Quarter 2006 • 21(4)
that price stability was not always
best for the consumer (Waugh,
1994). The protection from risk,
whether through price supports,
direct payments, or insurance, for
natural disasters involves a number of
rationales for government involve-
ment depending upon where one’s
interests are – helping beginning
farmers, ensuring an inexpensive
food supply, keeping farmers on the
land, etc. Most have some credence
as being in the national interest.
In some ways, agricultural policy
and the rationale for it is becoming
more closely tied to conservation of
the land and the sustainability of
agriculture than ever before. While
conservation during the dust bowls
of the 1930s was a rationale that
could stand alone, it also became the
vehicle for moving cash into rural
areas to meet income needs through
payments to farmers for adopting
conserving practices and setting land
aside. Today, conservation is a strong
independent rationale for agricultural
policy. The 1985 Farm Bill’s cross
compliance provision was to enforce
basic national conservation stan-
dards on those farmers wishing to
obtain the risk and income protec-
tion of commodity programs. The
compliance standards have been
reduced and enforcement has proved
unpopular so this device has less
impact. However, we see that the
newer programs for conservation on
working lands, EQIP, CSP, etc.,
reflect a public concern that conser-
vation be a primary rationale for gov-
ernment involvement in agriculture.
Programs like the Conservation
Reserve Program have brought new
supportive constituencies to agricul-
tural conservation – in this case
sportsmen and others interested in
wildlife habitat, as well as improved
water quality. 
Nutrition programs are out of the
inner circle of what is considered
essential to government’s involve-
ment in agriculture. If these pro-
grams are to remain within the
Department of Agriculture, they may
have to become more closely linked
to the traditional agricultural pro-
grams – if for no other reason than
their political importance to these
programs. The photos in most Con-
gressional offices show the Congress-
man involved in the school lunch
program, not in production agricul-
ture. Food safety is in the same polit-
ical situation. While nutrition and
food safety largely stand on their
own, other efforts, like export
enhancement and trade liberaliza-
tion, are intended to increase and/or
stabilize the incomes of farmers.
While rural development and
things like the FMHA programs
remain part of government’s involve-
ment, they have not been of major
importance since the Great Society.
Given the current availability of
credit from a variety of sources, there
is less argument that a government
credit role is as essential as it was in
the 1930s. For example, Farmer Mac
has not played the role that was envi-
sioned for it and does not appear to
be a least cost way to provide a func-
tion that may not be essential for
government today.
Conclusion
The rationale for government
involvement in agriculture has
evolved from indirect involvement in
the early years of the United States
and income parity and the credit
availability of the 1930s. Currently,
the central remaining issues are risk
reduction and the public’s willingness
to continue to provide income trans-
fers and other assistance to this sector
based on its strategic importance or
uniqueness. Senator Lugar’s ques-
tions focused on whether govern-
ment needed to continue to be
involved, and what the most cost
effective way to be involved would be
if that is required. Few today ask if
government involvement is needed,
what the rationale is for the involve-
ment, and then what the best way is
to provide support. This may change
as agriculture becomes viewed as a
producer of biofuels and other bio-
products in competition with food
and at a potentially higher cost to the
environment from more intensive
and/or extensive production.
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